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Abstract. Differential privacy is a notion of privacy that has become
very popular in the database community. Roughly, the idea is that a
randomized query mechanism provides sufficient privacy protection if
the ratio between the probabilities of two different entries to originate a
certain answer is bound by eǫ. In the fields of anonymity and informa-
tion flow there is a similar concern for controlling information leakage,
i.e. limiting the possibility of inferring the secret information from the
observables. In recent years, researchers have proposed to quantify the
leakage in terms of the information-theoretic notion of mutual informa-
tion. There are two main approaches that fall in this category: One based
on Shannon entropy, and one based on Re´nyi’s min entropy. The latter
has connection with the so-called Bayes risk, which expresses the prob-
ability of guessing the secret.
In this paper, we show how to model the query system in terms of an
information-theoretic channel, and we compare the notion of differential
privacy with that of mutual information. We show that the notion of
differential privacy is strictly stronger, in the sense that it implies a
bound on the mutual information, but not viceversa.
1 Introduction
The growth of information technology raises significant concerns about the vul-
nerability of sensitive information. The possibility of collecting and storing data
in large amount and the availability of powerful data processing techniques open
the way to the threat of inferring private and secret information, to such an
extent that fully justifies the users’ worries.
1.1 Differential privacy
The area of statistical databases has been, naturally, one of the first communities
to consider the issues related to the protection of information. Already some
⋆ This work has been partially supported by the project ANR-09-BLAN-0169-01
PANDA and by the INRIA DRI Equipe Associe´e PRINTEMPS.
decades ago, Dalenius [10] proposed a famous “ad omnia” privacy desideratum:
nothing about an individual should be learnable from the database that cannot
be learned without access to the database.
Dalenius’ property, however, is too strong to be useful in practice: it has
been shown by Dwork [11] that no useful database can provide it. In replace-
ment Dwork has proposed the notion of differential privacy, which has had an
extraordinary impact in the community. Intuitively, such notion is based on the
idea that the presence or the absence of an item in the database should not
change in a significant way the probability of obtaining a certain answer for a
given query [11,12,13,14].
In order to explain the concept more precisely, let us consider the typical
scenario: we have databases whose entries are values (possibly tuples) taken
from a given universe. A database can be queried by users which have honest
purposes, but also by attackers trying to infer secret or private data. In order
to control the leakage of secret information, the curator uses some randomized
mechanism, which causes a certain lack of precision in the answers. Clearly,
there is a trade off between the need of obtaining answers as precise as possible
for legitimate use, and the need to introduce some fuzziness to the purpose of
confusing the attacker.
Let K be the randomized function that provides the answers to the queries.
We say that K provides ǫ-differential privacy if for all databases D and D′, such
that one is a subset of the other and the larger contains a single additional entry,
and for all S ⊆ range(K), the ratio between the probability that the result of
K(D) is in S, and the probability that the result of K(D′) is in S, is at most eǫ.
Dwork has also studied sufficient conditions for a randomized function K to
implement a mechanism satisfying ǫ-differential privacy. It suffices to consider
a Laplacian distribution with variance depending on ǫ, and mean equal to the
correct answer [13]. This is a technique quite diffused in practice.
1.2 Quantitative information flow and anonymity
The problem of preventing the leakage of secret information has been a press-
ing concern also in the area of software systems, and has motivated a very
active line of research called secure information flow. Similarly to the case of
privacy, also in this field, at the beginning, the goal was ambitious: to ensure
non-interference, which means complete lack of leakage. But, as for Dalenius’
notion of privacy, no-intereference is too strong for being obtainable in practice,
and the community has started exploring weaker notions. Some of the most pop-
ular approaches are the quantitative ones, based on information theory. See for
instance [6,7,8,15,16,17,21].
Independently the field of anonymity, which is concerned with the protection
of the identity of agents performing certain tasks, has evolved towards similar
approaches. In the case of anonymity it is even more important to consider a
quantitative formulation, because anonymity protocols typically use randomiza-
tion to obfuscate the link between the culprit (i.e. the agent which performs the
task) and the observable effects of the task. The first notion of anonymity, due
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to Chaum [5], required that the observation would not change the probability
of an individual to be the culprit. In other words, the protocol should guarran-
tee that the observation does not increase the chances of learning the identity
of the culprit. This is very similar to Dalenius’ notion of privacy, and equally
unattainable in practice (at least, in the majority of real situations). Also in this
case, researchers in the area have started considering weaker notions based on
information theory, see for instance [3,18,22].
If we abstract from the kind of secrets and observables, anonymity and of
information flow are similar problems: there is some information that we want
to keep secret, there is a system that produces some kind of observable informa-
tion depending on the secret one, and we want to prevent as much as possible
that an attacker may infer the secrets from the observables. It is therefore not
surprising that the foundations of the two fields have converged towards the
same information theoretical approaches. The majority of these approaches are
based on the idea of representing the system (or protocol) as an information-
theoretic channel taking the secrets in input (X) and producing the observables
in output (Y ). The entropy of X , H(X), represents the converse of the a priori
vulnerability, i.e. the chance of the attacker to find out the secret. Similarly, the
conditional entropy of X given Y , H(X | Y ), represents the converse of the
a posteriori vulnerability, i.e. the chance of the attacker to find out the secret
after having observed the output. The mutual information between X and Y ,
I(X ;Y ) = H(X) − H(X | Y ), represents the gain for the adversary provided
by the observation, and is taken as definition of the information leakage of the
system. Sometimes we may want to abstract from the distribution of X , in which
case we can use the capacity of the channel, defined as the maximum of I(X ;Y )
over all possible distributions on X . This represents the worst case for leakage.
The various approaches in literature differ, mainly, for the notion of entropy.
Such notion is related to the kind of attackers we want to model, and to how we
measure their success (see [15] for an illuminating discussion of such relation).
Shannon entropy [20], on which most of the approaches are based, represents an
adversary which tries to find out the secret x by asking questions of the form
“does x belong to set S?”. Shannon entropy is precisely the average number of
questions necessary to find out the exact value of x with an optimal strategy
(i.e. an optimal choice of the S’s). The other most popular notion of entropy (in
this area) is Re´nyi’s min entropy [19]. The corresponding notion of attack is a
single try of the form “is x equal to v?”. Re´nyi’s min entropy is precisely the
log of the probability of guessing the true value with the optimal strategy, which
consists, of course, in selecting the v with the highest probability. Approaches
based on this notion include [21] and [2].
It is worth noting that, while the Re´nyi’s min entropy of X , H∞(X), rep-
resents the a priori probability of success (of the single-try attack), the Re´nyi’s
min conditional entropy of X given Y , H∞(X | Y ), represents the a posteriori
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probability of success1. This a posteriori probability is the converse of the Bayes
risk [9] , which has also been used as a measure of leakage [1,4].
1.3 Goal of the paper
From a mathematical point of view, privacy presents many similarities with
information flow and anonymity. The private data of the entry constitute the
secret, the answer to the query gives the observation, and the goal is to prevent
as much as possible the inference of the secret from the observable. Differential
privacy can be seen as a quantitative definition of the degree of leakage. The
main goal of this paper is to explore the relation with the alternative definitions
based on information theory, with the purpose of getting a better understanding
of the notion of differential privacy, of the specific problems related to privacy,
and of the models of attack used to formalize the notion of privacy, in relation
to those used for anonymity and information flow.
1.4 Contribution
The contribution of this paper is as follows:
– We show how the problem of privacy can be formulated in an information-
theoretic setting. More precisely, we show how the answer function K can be
associated to an information-theoretic channel.
– We prove that ǫ-differential privacy implies a bound on the Shannon mutual
information of the channel, and that this bound approach 0 as ǫ approaches
0. Same for Re´nyi min mutual information.
– We show that the viceversa of the above point does not hold, i.e. that Shan-
non and Re´nyi min mutual information (and also the corresponding capaci-
ties) can approach 0 while the ǫ parameter of differential privacy approaches
infinity.
1.5 Plan of the paper
Next section introduces some necessary background notions. Section 3 proposes
an information-theoretic view of the database query systems. Section 4 show
the main results of the paper, namely that differential privacy implies a bound
on Shannon and Re´nyi min mutual information, but not viceversa. Section 5
concludes and presents some ideas for future work.
The proofs of the results are in the appendix. Such appendix will not be
included in the proceeding version (for reasons of space), but the proofs will be
made available on line.
1 We should mention that Re´nyi did not define the conditional version of the min
entropy, and that there have been various different proposals in literature for this
notion. We use here the one proposed by Smith in [21].
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Differential privacy
We assume a fixed finite universe U in which the entries of databases may range.
The concept of differential privacy is tightly connected to the concept of adjacent
(or neighbor) databases.
Definition 1 ([13]). A pair of databases (D′, D′′) is considered adjacent (or
neighbors) if one is a proper subset of the other and the larger database contains
just one additional entry.
Dwork’s definition of differential privacy is the following:
Definition 2 ([11]). A randomized function K satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if
for all pairs of adjacent databases D′ and D′′, and all S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr[K(D′) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ × Pr[K(D′′) ∈ S] (1)
2.2 Information theory and interpretation in terms of attacks
In the following, X,Y denote two discrete random variables with carriers X =
{x1, . . . , xn}, Y = {y1, . . . , ym}, and probability distributions pX(·), pY (·), re-
spectively. An information-theoretic channel is constituted by an input X , an
output Y , and the matrix of conditional probabilities pY |X(· | ·), where pY |X(y |
x) represent the probability that Y is y given that X is x. We will use X ∧ Y
to represent the random variable with carrier X × Y and joint probability dis-
tribution pX∧Y (x, y) = pX(x) · pY |X(y | x). We shall omit the subscripts on the
probabilities when they are clear from the context.
2.3 Shannon entropy
The Shannon entropy of X is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x)
The minimum value H(X) = 0 is obtained when p(·) is concentrated on a single
value (i.e. when p(·) is a delta of Dirac). The maximum value H(X) = log |X | is
obtained when p(·) is the uniform distribution. Usually the base of the logarithm
is set to be 2 and, correspondingly, the entropy is measured in bits.
The conditional entropy of X given Y is
H(X | Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
p(y) H(X | Y = y)
where
H(X | Y = y) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x | y) log p(x | y)
5
We can prove that 0 ≤ H(X | Y ) ≤ H(X). The minimum value, 0, is obtained
when X is completely determined by Y . The maximum value H(X) is obtained
when Y reveals no information about X , i.e. when X and Y are independent.
The mutual information between X and Y is defined as
I(X ;Y ) = H(X)−H(X | Y ) (2)
and it measures the amount of information about X that we gain by observing
Y . It can be shown that I(X ;Y ) = I(Y ;X) and 0 ≤ I(X ;Y ) ≤ H(X).
Shannon capacity is defined as the maximum mutual information over all
possible input distributions:
C = max
pX (·)
I(X ;Y )
2.4 Re´nyi min-entropy
In [19], Re´nyi introduced an one-parameter family of entropy measures, intended
as a generalization of Shannon entropy. The Re´nyi entropy of order α (α > 0,
α 6= 1) of a random variable X is defined as
Hα(X) =
1
1− α
log
∑
x∈X
p(x)α
We are particularly interested in the limit of Hα as α approaches ∞. This is
called min-entropy. It can be proven that
H∞(X)
def
= lim
α→∞
Hα(X) = − log max
x∈X
p(x)
Re´nyi defined also the α-generalization of other information-theoretic no-
tions, like the Kullback-Leibler divergence. However, he did not define the α-
generalization of the conditional entropy, and there is no agreement on what
it should be. For the case α = ∞, we adopt here the definition of conditional
entropy proposed by Smith in [21]:
H∞(X | Y ) = − log
∑
y∈Y p(y)maxx∈X p(x | y) (3)
Analogously to (2), we can define the mutual information I∞ as H∞(X) −
H∞(X | Y ), and the capacity C∞ as maxpX (·) I∞(X ;Y ). It has been proven
in [2] that C∞ is obtained at the uniform distribution, and that it is equal to
the sum of the maxima of each column in the channel matrix:
C∞ =
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
p(y | x).
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3 An information theoretic model of privacy
In this section we show how to represent a database query system (of the kind
considered in differential privacy) in terms of an information-theoretic channel.
According to [11] and [13], differential privacy can be implemented by adding
some appropriately chosen random noise to the answer x = f(D), where f is the
query function and D is the database. The function can operate in the entire
database at once, and even though the query may be composed by a chain of sub-
queries, we assume that subsequent sub-queries depend only on the true answer
to previous sub-queries. Under this constraint, no matter how complex the query
is, it is still a function f of the database D. The scenario where subsequent sub-
queries can depend on the reported answer to previous queries corresponds to
adaptive adversaries [11], and is not considered in this paper.
After the true answer x to the query is obtained from D, some noise is intro-
duced in order to produce a reported answer y. The reported answer can be seen
as a random variable Y dependent on the random variable X corresponding to
the real answer, and the two random variables are related by a conditional prob-
ability distribution pY |X(·|·). The conditional probabilities pY |X(y|x) constitute
the matrix of an information theoretic channel from X to Y .
Figure 1 shows the scheme of implementation of a differential privacy scheme.
Database Query Randomization Reported Answer
D
r
Value of
f(D ∪ r)
=⇒
Channel
pY |X(·|·)
x1
...
xn
y1
...
ym
Randomized value
K(f(D ∪ r))
=⇒
Fig. 1. The channel corresponding to a differential privacy scheme.
In [11] it has been proved that a way to define the values of pY |X(·|·) so to
ensure ǫ-differential privacy, is by using the Laplace distribution:
P ((Y = y)|(X = x), ∆f/ǫ) =
∆f
2ǫ
e−|y−x|ǫ/∆f (4)
where ∆f is the L1-sensitivity of f , defined as2
∆f = max
D′,D′′ adjacent
|f(D′)− f(D′′)|.
2 We give here the definition for the case in which the range of f is R. In the more
general case in which the range is Rn we should replace |f(D′) − f(D′′)| by the
1-norm of the vector f(D′)− f(D′′).
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4 Relation between differential privacy and mutual
information
In this section we investigate the relation between differential privacy and information-
theoretic notions. We start by considering an equivalent definition of differential
privacy, easier to handle for our purposes.
4.1 Testing single elements
Definition 2 considers tests which check whether the result of K(D) belongs to a
certain set or not. We prefer to simplify this definition by considering only tests
over single elements:
Definition 3. A randomized function K gives δ-differential privacy if for all
pairs adjacent datasets D′ and D′′, and all k ∈ Range(K),
Pr[K(D′) = k] ≤ eδ × Pr[K(D′′) = k] (5)
The following result shows that our definition of differential privacy is equiv-
alent to the classical one.
Theorem 1. A function K gives ǫ-differential privacy iff it gives δ-differential
privacy, with ǫ = δ.
4.2 Databases with the same number of entries and differing in at
most one entry
Consider two databases D′ and D′′ that have the same number of entries and
differ in at most one entry as in Figure 2. Let D be the common part shared
by both databases, and let r′ and r′′ be the rows in which they differ, namely
D′ = D ∪ {r′} and D′′ = D ∪ {r′′}.
D
′


D
r
′
D
′′


D
r
′′
Fig. 2. Two databases differing in exactly one entry
We prove that δ-differential privacy imposes also a bound on the comparison
between databases with the same number of entries, and which differ in the
values of only one entry.
Lemma 1. Let K be a function that gives δ-differential privacy for all pairs of
adjacent databases. Given two databases D′ and D′′ that have the same number
of entries and differ in the value of at most one entry, then:
Pr[K(D′) = k] ≤ e2δ × Pr[K(D′′) = k]
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4.3 Shannon mutual information
We prove now that δ-differential privacy imposes a bound on Shannon mutual
information, and that this bound approaches 0 as the parameter δ approaches
0.
Theorem 2. If a randomized function K gives δ-differential privacy according
to Definition 3, then for every result x∗ of the function f the Shannon mutual
information between the true answers X (i.e. the results of f) and the reported
answers Y (i.e. the results of K) is bounded by:
I(X ;Y ) ≤ (e2δ + e−2δ)δ log(e) + (e2δ − e−2δ)
∑
y
p(y|x∗) log(p(y|x∗))
It is easy to see that the expression which bounds I from above, (e2δ +
e−2δ)δ log(e) + (e2δ − e−2δ)
∑
y p(y|x
∗) log(p(y|x∗)), converges to 0 when δ ap-
proaches 0.
The converse of Theorem 2 does not hold. One reason is that mutual in-
formation is sensitive to the values of the input distribution, while differential
privacy is not. Next example illustrates this point.
Example 1. Let n be the number of elements of the universe, andm the cardinal-
ity of the set of possible answers of f . Assume that p(x1) = α and p(xi) =
1−α
n−1
for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Let p(y1 | x1) = β, p(yj | x1) =
1−β
m−1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ m,
and p(yj | xi) =
1
m . otherwise. This channel is represented in Figure 0(a).
It is easy to see that the Shannon mutual information approaches 0 as α ap-
proaches 0, independently of the value of β. Differential privacy, however, de-
pends only on the value of β, more precisely, the parameter of differential privacy
is max{loge
1
mβ , logemβ, loge
m−1
m(1−β) , loge
m(1−β)
m−1 }, and it is easy to see that such
parameter is unbound and goes to infinity as β approaches 0.
The reasoning in the counterexample above is not valid anymore if we con-
sider capacity instead than mutual information. However, there is another reason
why the converse of Theorem 2 does not hold, and this remains the case also if
we consider capacity. The situation is illustrated by the following example.
Example 2. Let n be the number of elements of the universe, andm the cardinal-
ity of the set of possible answers of f . Assume that p(yi | xi) = β and p(yi | xj) =
1−β
m−1 for i 6= j. This channel is represented in Figure 0(b). It is easy to see that
the Shannon capacity is C = logm−(1−β) log(m−1)+β log β+(1−β) log(1−β),
and that C approaches 0 as β approaches 0 and m becomes large. Differential
privacy, however, goes in the other direction when β approaches 0, and it is not
very sensitive to the value of m. More precisely, the parameter of differential
privacy is max{loge
1−β
β(1−m) ,
β(1−m)
1−β }, and it is easy to see that such parameter
is unbound and goes to infinity as β approaches 0, independently of the value of
m.
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(a) Example 1
pX(·)
α
1−α
m−1
...
1−α
m−1
y1 y2 . . . ym
x1 β
1−β
m−1
. . . 1−β
m−1
x2
1
m
1
m
. . . 1
m
...
...
...
. . .
...
xn
1
m
1
m
. . . 1
m
(b) Example 2
y1 y2 . . . ym
x1 β
1−β
m−1
. . . 1−β
m−1
x2
1−β
m−1
β . . . 1−β
m−1
...
...
...
. . .
...
xn
1−β
m−1
1−β
m−1
. . . β
Table 1. The channels of Examples 1 and 2
4.4 Re´nyi min mutual information
We show now that a result analogous to that of Section 4.3 holds also in the
case of Re´nyi min entropy.
Theorem 3. If a randomized function K gives δ-differential privacy according
to Definition 3, then the Re´nyi min mutual information between the true answer
of the function X and the reported answer Y is bounded by
I∞(X ;Y ) ≤ 2δ log e.
The converse of Theorem 3 does not hold, not even if we consider capacity
instead than mutual information. It is easy to prove, in fact, that Examples 1
and 2 lead to counterexamples also in the case of Re´nyi min mutual information
and capacity.
5 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have shown that the problem of privacy in statistical databases
can be formulated in information-theoretic terms, in a way analogous to what
has been done for information flow and anonymity: the database query system
can be seen as a noisy channel, in the information-theoretic sense. Then we have
considered Dwork’s notion of differential privacy, and we have shown that it is
strictly stronger than requiring the channel to have low capacity, both for the
cases of Shannon and Re´nyi min entropy. It is natural to consider, then, whether
a weaker notion would give enough privacy guarrantees. As future work, we
intend to investigate this question.
We first need to understand, of course, what are the constraints that could
be relaxed in the notion of differential privacy. To this aim, Example 2 is quite
interesting: whenever we get an answer y, there are n−1 possible inputs (entries)
which are equally likely to have generated that answer, and one input x that
is much less likely than the others (p(x|y) = α, where α is a very small value).
The existence of the latter seems quite harmless, yet it is exactly that entry that
causes differential privacy to fail (in the sense that its parameter is unbound).
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The notion of Re´nyi min capacity seems a plausible candidate for the notion of
privacy: it’s relation with the Bayes risk ensures that a bound C∞ can be seen as
a bound on the probability of guessing the right value of x (given the obsevable).
In some scenario, this may be exactly what we want.
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Appendix
Theorem 4 (Theorem 1 in the paper). A function K gives ǫ-differential
privacy iff it gives δ-differential privacy, with ǫ = δ.
Proof.
⇒ Let k ∈ Range(K). Then for all pair of adjacent databases D′, D′′ we have
Pr[K(D′) = k] = Pr[K(D′) ∈ {k}] (taking S to be a singleton set)
≤ eǫPr[K(D′′) ∈ {k}] (by Definition 2)
= eǫPr[K(D′′) = k]
⇐ Let S ⊆ Range(K)
Pr[K(D′) ∈ S] =
∑
k∈S
Pr[K(D′) = k] (by union of elements)
≤
∑
k∈S
eδPr[K(D′′) = k] (by Definition 3)
= eδ
∑
k∈S
Pr[K(D′′) = k] (by distributivity)
= eδPr[K(D′′) ∈ S] (by union of elements)
Lemma 2 (Lemma 1 in the paper). Let K be a function that gives δ-
differential privacy for all pairs of adjacent databases. Given two databases D′
and D′′ that have the same number of entries and differ in the value of at most
one entry, then:
Pr[K(D′) = k] ≤ e2δ × Pr[K(D′′) = k]
Proof. Let us call D the common part that D′ and D′′ share, and let us call r′
and r′′ the entries in which they differ, in such a way that D′ = D ∪ {r′} and
Pr[K(D ∪ {r′}) = k] ≤ eδ × Pr[K(D) = k] (by Definition 3)
≤ eδ × eδ × Pr[K(D ∪ {r′′}) = k] (by Definition 3)
≤ e2δ × Pr[K(D′′) = k]
Theorem 5 (Theorem 2 in the paper). If a randomized function K gives
δ-differential privacy according to Definition 3, then for every result x∗ of the
function f the Shannon mutual information between the true answers X (i.e.
the results of f) and the reported answers Y (i.e. the results of K) is bounded
by:
I(X ;Y ) ≤ (e2δ + e−2δ)δ log(e) + (e2δ − e−2δ)
∑
y
p(y|x∗) log(p(y|x∗))
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Proof. Let us calculate the Shannon mutual information using the formula I(X ;Y ) =
H(Y )−X(Y |X).
H(Y ) = −
∑
y
p(y) log p(y) (by definition)
= −
∑
y
(∑
x
p(x, y)
)
log
(∑
x
p(x, y)
)
(by probability laws)
= −
∑
y
(∑
x
p(x)p(y|x)
)
log
(∑
x
p(x)p(y|x)
)
(by probability laws)
≤ −
∑
y
(∑
x
p(x)e−2δp(y|x∗)
)
log
(∑
x
p(x)e−2δp(y|x∗)
)
(by Definition 3 and Lemma 1)
= −
∑
y
e−2δp(y|x∗)
(∑
x
p(x)
)
log
(
e−2δp(y|x∗)
∑
x
p(x)
)
= −
∑
y
e−2δp(y|x∗) log(e−2δp(y|x∗)) (by probability laws)
= −
∑
y
(
e−2δp(y|x∗) log e−2δ
)
−
∑
y
(
e−2δp(y|x∗) log p(y|x∗)
)
(by distributivity)
= −e−2δ log e−2δ
(∑
y
p(y|x∗)
)
−
∑
y
(
e−2δp(y|x∗) log p(y|x∗)
)
= δe−2δ log e− e−2δ
∑
y
p(y|x∗) log p(y|x∗) (by probability laws)
(6)
H(Y |X) = −
∑
x
p(x)
∑
y
p(y|x) log p(y|x) (by definition)
≥ −
∑
x
p(x)
∑
y
e2δp(y|x∗) log(e2δp(y|x∗)) (by Definition 3 and Lemma 1)
= −
(∑
y
e2δp(y|x∗) log(e2δp(y|x∗))
)∑
x
p(x) (by distributivity)
= −
∑
y
e2δp(y|x∗) log(e2δp(y|x∗)) (by probability laws)
= −
∑
y
(
e2δp(y|x∗) log(e2δ)
)
−
∑
y
(
e2δp(y|x∗) log p(y|x∗)
)
= −eδ log e2δ
(∑
y
p(y|x∗)
)
− e2δ
∑
y
p(y|x∗) log p(y|x∗)
= −δe2δ log e− e2δ
∑
y
p(y|x∗) log p(y|x∗) (by probability laws)
(7)
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I(X ;Y ) = H(Y )−X(Y |X) (by definition)
≤ δe−2δ log e− e−2δ
∑
x
p(y|x∗) log p(y|x∗)+
2δe2δ log e+ e2δ
∑
y
p(y|x∗) log p(y|x∗) (by Equations 6 and 7)
= (e2δ + e−2δ)δ log(e) + (e2δ − e−2δ)
∑
y
p(y|x∗) log(p(y|x∗)) (by distributivity)
Theorem 6 (Theorem 3 in the paper). If a randomized function K gives
δ-differential privacy according to Definition 3, then the Re´nyi min mutual in-
formation between the true answer of the function X and the reported answer Y
is bounded by:
I∞(X ;Y ) ≤ 2δ log e.
Proof. Let us calculate the Re´nyi mutual information using the formula I∞(X ;Y ) =
H∞(X)−X∞(X |Y ).
H∞(X) = − logmax
x
p(x) (by definition) (8)
H∞(X |Y ) = − log
∑
y
p(y)max
x
p(x|y) (by definition)
= − log
∑
y
max
x
p(y)p(x|y)
= − log
∑
y
max
x
p(x)p(y|x) (by probability laws)
≥ − log
∑
y
max
x
p(x)e2δp(y|x∗) (by Definition 3 and Lemma 1)
= − log
∑
y
e2δp(y|x∗)max
x
p(x)
= − log
(
e2δmax
x
p(x)
∑
y
p(y|x∗)
)
= − log
(
e2δmax
x
p(x)
)
(by probability laws)
= −2δ log e− logmax
x
p(x)
(9)
I∞(X ;Y ) = H∞(X)−H∞(X |Y ) (by definition)
≤ − logmax
x
p(x) + 2δ log e+ logmax
x
p(x) (by Equations 8 and 9)
= 2δ log e
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